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We propose a simple non-cooperative mechanism of network formation
in cost spanning tree problems. The only subgame equilibrium payoﬀ is
eﬃcient. Moreover, we extend the result to the case of budget restrictions.
The equilibrium payoﬀ can them be easily adapted to the framework of
Steiner trees.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Many problems involving network formation have been studied in the opera-
tional research and the economic literature. The most explored issues in oper-
ational research are the design of eﬃcient algorithms and their computational
complexity. The economic literature focuses on aspects such like the cost shar-
ing of the network and the design of mechanisms trying to explain the way in
which the network forms.
In this paper we focus in the cost sharing aspect. In particular, we study
cost spanning tree problems (cstp). Consider that a group of agents, located
at diﬀerent geographical places, want some particular service which can only be
provided by a common supplier, called the source. Agents will be served through
connections which entail some cost. However, they do not care whether they
are connected directly or indirectly to the source.
There are many economic situations that can be modeled in this way. For
instance, several towns may draw power from a common power plant, and hence
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1they have to share cost of the distribution network. This example appears in
Dutta and Kar (2002). Bergantiños and Lorenzo (2004) study a real situation
where villagers should pay the cost of constructing pipes to a the water supplier.
The literature about cstp starts by deﬁning algorithms for constructing min-
imal cost spanning trees (mcst). We can mention, for instance, the algorithms
of Kruskal (1956) and Prim (1957). Once the mcst is constructed, the next
issue is how to allocate the cost associated to the mcst between the agents.
Bird (1976) studies this problem using game theory. Bird associates to each
cstp a cooperative game and proposes a cost allocation rule based on Prim (1957)
algorithm. This paper has generated more literature. For instance, Grannot and
Huberman (1981, 1984) study the core and the nucleolus of the game and Kar
(2002) the Shapley value. Following Bird’s approach, Feltkamp, Tijs, and Muto
(1994) propose a rule based on Kruskal algorithm, and Dutta and Kar (2004)
propose another rule based on Prim algorithm. Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga
(2004) show that the rule deﬁned by Feltkamp et al. can also be deﬁned as the
Shapley value of a diﬀerent cooperative game. We call this rule ˇ ϕ.
Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2004) show that ˇ ϕ satisﬁes a number of ap-
pealing properties. For example:
Core selection No subset of agents can reduce their cost by themselves.
Strong cost monotonicity If the cost of an arc increases, no agent is better-
oﬀ.
Population monotonicity No agent is worse when a new node joins the net-
work.
Equal share of extra costs In problems in which the most expensive arcs are
those adjacent to the source, an increase in the cost of these arcs is equally
shared by all the agents.
Equal contributions The impact of the connection of agent j on agent’s i
cost coincides with the impact of the connection of agent i on agent’s j
cost.
For a detailed description of these properties, the reader is referred to Bergan-
tiños and Vidal-Puga (2004).
Moreover, Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2004) show that ˇ ϕ is characterized
by strong cost monotonicity, population monotonicity, and equal share of extra
costs. Moreover, it is the only rule that satisﬁes equal contributions.
Another problem is to ﬁnd non-cooperative mechanisms in which players,
by acting as utility-maximizers, agree on how to share the cost of an eﬃcient
graph. This problem is not trivial. Bergantiños and Lorenzo (2004) study a real-
life problem in which the agents connect ineﬃciently to the source. Moreover,
players may have budget restrictions. The problem with budget restrictions in
addressed in Bergantiños and Lorenzo (2003).
In this paper, we design a non-cooperative mechanism in which players agree
on an optimal tree. Moreover, the equilibrium cost is given by ˇ ϕ.
2The idea of the mechanism is quite simple: in a ﬁrst stage, agents oﬀer prices
to each other. These prices represent the amount that the agents are willing to
pay to other agents if they connect. Then, the agent with maximum net oﬀer
is asked to connect to the source. In order to get eﬃciency, we still allow the
agent to connect to the source through other nodes. Thus, the chosen agent is
allowed to propose a graph that connects him to the source. If all the aﬀected
agents agree, these nodes connect to the source and the process is repeated with
the rest of the players. Otherwise, the proposer should connect to the source
on his own.
The choice of a particular agent by means of his net oﬀer has been pre-
viously used in the literature of implementation. For example, Pérez-Castrillo
and Wettstein (2001, 2002), Mustuswami, Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2004),
Vidal-Puga and Bergantiños (2003), Vidal-Puga (2002), and Porteiro (2003). In
these paper, the oﬀers are bids for the right to make a ’take-it-or-leave-it-oﬀer’.
Thus, the proposer should pay to the other players. As opposed, in this paper
the oﬀers establish a status quo that points the node that should connect. More-
over, the chosen agent receives in exchange the proposal oﬀered by the other
agents.
This model can be easily extended to the case in which players have budget
restrictions. By budget restrictions, we mean a wide range of reasons under
which players whould not pay any price to be connected. This may happen
because some agents have not enough money to pay high cost. Another possible
reason is that the utility of being connected might not be enough to compensate
agents if they have to pay high connection costs.
In order to deal with cases in which agents have budget restrictions, we
give the proposer the choice to declare himself as insolvent. When a player
is declared insolvent, he remains as a passive player. A passive player cannot
make oﬀers, but he still can receive them. The negotiation goes on with a set
of active players who make oﬀers and proposals and vote them, and a set of
passive players who vote them when aﬀected.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the notation.
In Section 3 we introduce the mechanism. In Sections 4 and 5 we study the
case with budget restrictions and prove the main result. In Section 6 we show
that Steiner trees can be considered as a special case of problems with budget
restrictions.
2N o t a t i o n
Let N = {1,2,...} be the set of all possible agents. We are interested in networks
whose nodes are elements of a set N0 = N ∪0,w h e r eN ⊂ N is ﬁnite and 0 is a
distinguished node called the source. Our interest lies on networks where each
node in N is (directly or indirectly) connected to the source.
A cost matrix C =( cij)i,j∈N0 on N represents the cost of direct link between
any pair of nodes. We assume that cij = cji ≥ 0 for each i,j ∈ N0,a n dcii =0
for each i ∈ N0.T h ep a i r(N0,C) determines a (cost spanning) problem for N.
3We denote by CN the set of all cost matrices for N.
We denote by GN the set of all networks whose nodes are N0. The elements
of g ∈ GN are called arcs.G i v e n a g r a p h g and a pair of nodes i and j,a
path from i to j is a sequence {(ih−1,i h)}
l
h=1 satisfying (ih−1,i h) ∈ g for all
h ∈ {1,2,...,l}, i = i0 and j = il. We say that the node i is connected in the
graph g if there exists a path from i to the source. If (i,j) ∈ g,w es a yt h a ti
and j are directly linked in g.P l a y e r si,j ∈ N are linked if there exists a path
from i to j which do not include the source.
We denote by GN
0 ⊂ GN the set of spanning graphs in N, i.e. the set of
graphs such that every agent in N is connected to the source.
Let g ∈ GN.W ed e n o t eb yS (g) ⊂ N the set of nodes which are connected
in g.W ed e n o t eb yD(g) the set of nodes which are not connected in g.





When there are no ambiguities, we write c(g) instead of c(C,g).
Given C ∈ CN,w ed e ﬁne the cost associated to C as




We are interested in assigning the cost of forming a network among the
players. This motivates the following deﬁnition: A (cost allocation) rule for
N is a function ψ : CN → RN satisfying
P
i∈N ψi (C) ≥ c(C).E a c h ψi (C)
represents the cost assigned to player i for building the network.
A minimum cost spanning tree (mcst)f o rC is a tree t ∈ GN
0 such that
c(t)=c(C). It is clear that the mcst exists for each C, even though it does
not need to be unique.





i,j∈S the cost matrix
obtained from C assuming that agents of T = N\S have left. This means that
CS is the restriction of C to S0; i.e. cS
ij = cij for all i,j ∈ S0.
Two interesting properties of a rule are:
Eﬃciency Ar u l eψ is eﬃcient if
P
i∈N ψi (C)=c(C).
Core selection Ar u l eψ satisﬁes core selection if
P




all S ⊂ N.






for all S ⊂ N. If a rule always selects one of these elements, no subset
of players would ever have incentives to refuse the proposed allocation and ﬁnd
another one decreasing their cost.
Or course, core selection implies eﬃciency.






i,j∈S the cost matrix





Figure 1: ˆ vC (a)=8 , ˆ vC (b)=ˆ vC (ab) = 12; ˇ vC (a)=ˇ vC (b)=4 , ˇ vC (ab)=1 2
they have become sources themselves). This means that c
+S
ij = cij for each
i,j ∈ N\S and c
+S
i0 =m i n j∈S0 cij for each i ∈ N\S.















Note that ˆ vC (S) is the minimal cost of connecting all agents to the source
without counting on players in N\S (see Figure 1). On the other hand, ˇ vC (S) is
the cost of connecting all agents to the source assuming that agents of N\S are
already connected. We denote by ˆ ϕ(C) and ˇ ϕ(C) the Shapley value (Shapley,






, respectively. Of course, both ˆ ϕ and ˇ ϕ
are eﬃcient rules for N.
For simplicity, when there are no other cost matrices present, we denote
ˆ v,ˇ v, ˆ ϕ and ˇ ϕ instead of ˆ vC, ˇ vC, ˆ ϕ(C) and ˇ ϕ(C), respectively.
3 The non-cooperative mechanism
In each round, there exists a set A of active players and a cost matrix C ∈ CN.
In the ﬁrst round, A = N.W ed e n o t eb yM0 (A,C) the mechanism played with
these elements.










i ∈ R+ represents the payoﬀ that player i is willing to pay to player j
so that player j connects to the source. We deﬁne the net proposal of player i
as the diﬀerence between what other players oﬀer to player i and what player i











One of the players with the highest net proposal is then randomly chosen
as proposer. Assume player α is chosen. Then, player α receives xα
i from each
5i ∈ A\α.N o w , p l a y e r α proposes a (maybe incomplete) graph g ∈ GN such
that α ∈ S (g),a n dav e c t o ro fy ∈ RA such that
P
i∈A yi = c(C,g).T h e
vector y represents the contribution that each player in A should give for the
construction of the graph g.
If all players in A accept this proposal (they are asked in some prespeciﬁed
order), then the graph g is formed and each player i ∈ A pays yi. These players




Thus, the ﬁnal payoﬀ for player i ∈ A is as follows:




• if i ∈ S (g),h ep a y sxα
i + yi,
• if i ∈ D(g),h ep a y sxα




If at least a player in A rejects the proposal, then player α should form a
link with the source and leave the game. The rest of the players play the game
M0 (A\α,C+α).T h u s ,t h eﬁnal cost for player i ∈ A is as follows:




• if i 6= α,h ep a y sxα
i plus the cost associated to playing the game M0 (A\α,C+α).
The mechanism goes on until all the players are connected, i.e. D(g)=∅.
Theorem 1 There exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoﬀ in the
bargaining mechanism, and it is given by ˇ ϕ.
Proof. It is an immediate consequence of Theorem 7 and Proposition 8 in
Section 5.
4 The problem with budget restrictions
In the previous sections we implicitly assumed that players value the connection
to the source enough so that individual rationality is guaranteed, i.e. if player
i values in vi ∈ R the connection to the source, then vi ≥ ˇ ϕi.T h e r e m a y b e
situations, however, in which the connection to the source is not proﬁtable for
some players. This may be due to lack of liability by the players, or that they
simply do not value the connection to the source enough so that it is not eﬃcient
for them to connect. However, it may also be eﬃcient that some players connect
to the source, even if they do not value this connection. For example, see the
example in Figure 2. The numbers in brackets indicate each player’s value to
connection to the source. The rule for this problem is (6,6) but player a is not
willing to pay it. However, player b still has incentives to pay to player a and
use his link to the source.
In any case, we should focus the situation as a problem of assignment of





Figure 2: A problem with budget restrictions.
g ∈ GN is given by a function vi : GN → R. In the case of the cost spanning
problem, this function is given by
vi (g)=
½
vi if i ∈ S (g)
0 if i ∈ D(g).
for some v ∈ RN.G i v e ni ∈ N, we will assume that vi 6= cij for all j ∈ N0.
Instead of assigning costs, we assign utilities. For example, let ˇ wC be TU
game deﬁned by










for all S ⊂ N. When agents have no budget restrictions, this game is equivalent
(up to a linear transformation of utilities) to the dual of ˇ v, and thus their
Shapley values are also equivalent. However, in the example of Figure 2 (with
budget restrictions) the game ˇ w is given by ˇ wC (a)=1 , ˇ wC (ab)=9 6 ,a n d
ˇ wC (ab)=9 3 . Thus, the Shapley value assigns −1 to player a, i.e. player a
should pay 6 for the connection, even though he only values it in 5.
In this section, we propose a modiﬁcation of the value so that this problem
is solved.
A solution is a function that assigns to each (generalized) cost spanning
problem (N,C,v) a vector in RN. We are interested in solutions which satisfy
at least the following properties:






vi (g) − c(C,g)
Eﬃciency For each problem (N,C,v),
X
i∈N





vi (g) − c(C,g)
#
.
7Individual rationality For each problem (N,C,v) and each i ∈ N,
fi ≥ 0.




by (1). Then, ˇ ϕ is a feasible and eﬃcient solution. However, it does not satisfy
individual rationality.
Consider again the example in Figure 2. In the optimistic version of the
Shapley value (games ˇ v and ˇ w), player b would connect to the source at a cost
of 4, because it is assumed that player a had already connected to the source. In
the pessimistic version (game ˆ v)t h i sc o s tw o u l db e12. Since player a has now
limited liability, we cannot assume that player a would connect to the source
without player b. Thus, we take an intermediate approach. We will assume
that the cost of a coalition is computed assuming that the other players had
connected to the source (like in the optimistic version) but only if they ﬁnd it
proﬁtable.
For example, in Figure 2, player b would connect to the source at a cost of
7. This value is computed as follows: player a values its connection in 5,a n d
player b ﬁnds it proﬁtable to pay the cost 12 of the two links joining him and
the source through player a. Then, 7 is the diﬀerence between 12 and 5.O nt h e
other hand, the cost for player a would be 4,b e c a u s ep l a y e rb ﬁnds it proﬁtable
to connect even when player a is not present. In terms of utilities, the game




and the Shapley value would be ¯ ϕ =( 0 .5,92.5); i.e. the mcst is formed at a
price of 12,p l a y e ra pays 4.5 and player b pays 7.5.
Notice that, even though ¯ w is a more realistic game than ˇ w, they share the
same optimistic philosophy. The cost of a player is computed assuming that the
other player, if not connected to the source, will allow not only to connect to
t h es o u r c et h r o u g hh i m ,b u th ew i l la l s op a yh i sv a l u et ob ec o n n e c t e d .W ew i l l
call this kind of players passive players. The rest of the players are called active
players.
We will now deﬁne ¯ w formally. In the general case, there may be many
passive players. We deﬁne ¯ w depending on the partition {A,P} of N,w h e r eA
is the set of active players and P i st h es e to fp a s s i v ep l a y e r s .
















8Note that the maximizer graph may be the empty graph. In particular, if
A = ∅,t h e nGN
A = {∅} and thus ¯ ω(A,P,C,v)=0 .
We now deﬁne ¯ ϕ by induction on the number of active players. If A = ∅,
then ¯ ϕi (A,P,C,v)=0for all i ∈ N.
Assume we have deﬁned ¯ ϕi (A0,P0,C0,v) for all A0 with less than |A| active
players.
Given A,P ⊂ N and C ∈ CN we will compute ¯ ϕ(A,P,C,v) in terms of
equal contributions. The property of equal contributions implies that, given
any pair of players i,j ∈ A, the gains of a player i when player j leaves the
game equal the gains of player i when player i leaves the game1. A player leaves
t h eg a m ei nt w op o s s i b l ef o r m s :H em a yb ec o n n e c t e dt ot h es o u r c e( a si nt h e
optimistic value) or he becomes passive. He would only connect to the source if
it is proﬁtable to do so. Formally, let di
j (A,P,C) ∈ RS\i be the value of player







if ci0 ≤ vi
¯ ϕ(A\i,P ∪ i,C,v) if ci0 >v i
Note that both ¯ ϕ
¡
A\i,P,C+j¢
and ¯ ϕ(A\i,P ∪ j,C) are well-deﬁned by in-
duction hypothesis.
For simplicity, we denote di ∈ RN\i instead of di (A,P,C).

















for all i ∈ A,a n d
¯ ϕi (A,P,C,v)=0
for all i ∈ P.
Remark 2 The formula given by (2) resembles those of the Shapley value that
appears in Maschler and Owen (1989) and Hart and Mas-Colell (1989). How-
ever, ¯ ϕ is not the Shapley value of a game form. It depends on the set of active
and passive players.
For simplicity, we denote ¯ ϕ or ¯ ϕ(C) instead of ¯ ϕ(A,P,C,v).
We know state our property of equal contributions as follows:
Generalized Equal Contributions (GEC) For any A,P,a n da n yi,j ∈ A,
d
j
i − ¯ ϕi = di
j − ¯ ϕj.
The next property is a generalization of eﬃciency:
1We consider that a player leaves the game in an optimistic way, that is why there are
gains.




At u p l e(A,P,C,v) is called a generalized problem, and it generalizes the
problems with budget restrictions (when P = ∅). A generalized value is a
function which assign to each (A,P,C,v) a vector of utilities f ∈ RN.N o t i c e
that a generalized value f in the class of generalized problems induces a value in
the class of problems with budget restrictions: Take g(N,C,v)=f (N,∅,C,v).
GEC is a very strong property and no value satisﬁes both GEﬀ and GEC.
We consider then the following weaker form of GEC:
Weak Generalized Equal Contributions (WGEC) For any A,P,a n da n y












j − ¯ ϕj
¢
.
Lemma 3 Let i ∈ A be such that there exists an optimal graph g with i/ ∈ S (g).
Then,
¯ ϕ(A,P,C,v)=¯ ϕ(A\i,P ∪ i,C,v).
Proof. Note ﬁrst that ci0 >v i. Otherwise, any optimal graph should include
player i.





if cj0 ≤ vj
di ¡
A\j,P ∪ j,C+i¢
if cj0 >v j.
We proceed by induction on |A|.I fA = {i},t h e n¯ w(A,P,C)=0and the
result holds. Assume now the result is true for less than |A| active players. We















 =¯ ϕk (A\i,P ∪ i,C,v).
Let g be an optimal graph such that i/ ∈ S (g).G i v e na n yj ∈ A\i,w es e e
two cases:




.M o r e o v e r ,cij >v i.
Now, the graph g has a cycle in C+j. By removing the most expensive arc
of this cycle, we get an optimal graph g0 such that i/ ∈ S (g). By induction
hypothesis, dj = dji.
• If cj0 >v j,t h e ndj =¯ ϕ(A\j,P ∪ j,C,v) and g is still a mcst such that
i/ ∈ S (g). By induction hypothesis, dj = dji.
10Moreover, dk
i =0and di





















































[(|A| − 1) ¯ ϕk (A\i,P ∪ i,C,v)+¯ ϕk (A\i,P ∪ i,C,v)]
=¯ ϕk (A\i,P ∪ i,C,v).
Proposition 4 ¯ ϕ satisﬁes individual rationality, i.e. ¯ ϕi (A,P,C,v) ≥ 0 for all
i ∈ N.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the number of active players |A|.I f|A| =0 ,
then the result is trivial. Assume the result is true for less than |A| active players.
Let i ∈ N.I f i ∈ P, it is clear that ¯ ϕi =0 . Assume then i ∈ A.W es e et w o
cases,





for all j ∈ N\i.S i n c e¯ ϕ satisﬁes





































• if ci0 >v i,t h e ndi
j =¯ ϕj (A\i,P ∪ i,C,v) for all j ∈ N\i and moreover








































11Our value is characterized by GEﬀ, WGEC and individual rationality:
Proposition 5 There exists a unique generalized value which satisﬁes GEﬀ,
WGEC and individual rationality, and it is ¯ ϕ.























We check now that ¯ ϕ satisﬁes WGEC.
Given i ∈ A,b yd e ﬁnition



































We check now that ¯ ϕ is the unique generalized value satisfying GEﬀ and





































which is the formula given by (2). Moreover,
P
i∈A σi =¯ w(A,P,C,v) and thus
GEﬀ implies
P
i∈P σi =0 . By individual rationality, σi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ P and
hence σi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ P.
Remark 6 The three properties are independent. Let f be the value fi =0for
all i ∈ N.L e tg be the value gi =¯ w(A,P,C,v)/n for all i ∈ N.L e th be the
value hi =¯ ϕi for all i ∈ A, hi =1− |P| if i =m i nP,a n dhi =1if i ∈ P and
i>minP. Then, it is straightforward to check the following table:
GEﬀ WGEC ind.rat.
f NO YES YES
g YES NO YES
h YES YES NO.
125 The generalized mechanism
We restate the mechanism as follows: In each round, there exists a set A of
active players, a set P of passive players, and a cost matrix C ∈ CN.I nt h eﬁrst
round, A = N and P = ∅.W ed e n o t eb yM(A,P,C) or M(C) the mechanism
played with these elements.










i ∈ R+ represents the payoﬀ that player i is willing to pay to player j so
that player j connects to the source. We deﬁne the net oﬀer of player i as












One of the players with the highest net proposal is then randomly chosen
as proposer. Assume player α is chosen. Then, player α receives xα
i from each
i ∈ A\α.N o w ,p l a y e rα proposes a (maybe incomplete) graph g ∈ GN such that
α ∈ S (g), and a vector of y ∈ RA∪S(g) such that
P
i∈A∪S(g) yi = c(C,g).T h e
vector y represents the contribution that each player in A ∪ S (g) should give
for the construction of the graph g.
If all players in A ∪ S (g) accept this proposal (they are asked in some pre-
speciﬁed order), then the graph g is formed and each player i ∈ A ∪ S (g) pays




Thus, the ﬁnal payoﬀ for player i ∈ N is as follows:




• if i ∈ A\α and i ∈ S (g),h eg e t svi − xα
i − yi;
• if i ∈ A\α and i ∈ D(g),h eg e t s−xα





• if i ∈ P and i ∈ S (g),h eg e t svi − yi;




If at least a player in A∪S (g) rejects the proposal, then player α can declare
himself as solvent or insolvent.
If player α declare himself as solvent, then he forms a link with the source
and leaves the game. The rest of the players play the game M(A\α,P,C+α).
Thus, the ﬁnal payoﬀ for player i ∈ N is as follows:




• if i ∈ A\α, he gets the payoﬀ associated with playing the game M(A\α,P,C+α)
minus xα
i ;
• if i ∈ P, he gets the payoﬀ associated with playing the game M(A\α,P,C+α).
13If player α declare himself as insolvent, then he becomes passive and the
game M(A\α,P ∪ α,C) is played. The ﬁnal payoﬀ for player i ∈ N is as
follows:
• if i = α,h eg e t s
P
j6=α xα
j plus the payoﬀ associated with playing the game
M(A\α,P ∪ α,C);
• if i ∈ A\α, he gets the payoﬀ associated with playing the game M(A\α,P ∪ α,C)
minus xα
i ;
• if i ∈ P, he gets the payoﬀ associated with playing the game M(A\α,P ∪ α,C).
The mechanism goes on until there are no more active players. In this case,
no additional links are formed, and each passive player remains disconnected.
The payoﬀ is then zero for everyone.
Theorem 7 There exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoﬀ in the
bargaining mechanism, and it is given by ¯ ϕ(N,∅,C,v).
Proof. We will prove the following stronger result:
There exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoﬀ in the subgame
M(A,P,C), and it is given by ¯ ϕ(A,P,C,v).
The proof proceeds by induction on the number of active players |A|.T h e
result trivially holds for |A| =0 .
We now assume that the theorem holds for less than |A| active players and
show that it also holds for |A| active players. We ﬁrst prove that ¯ ϕ is indeed
an equilibrium outcome. We explicitly construct an equilibrium that yields ¯ ϕ
as outcome.
Consider the following set of strategies for the players in M(A,P,C):
If i ∈ A and there does not exist any eﬃcient graph including player i,h e
proposes x
j
i =0to each j ∈ A\i and he declares insolvent should he be chosen
as proposer.





i −¯ ϕi to each j ∈ A\i.I fp l a y e ri is chosen as proposer, he proposes (g,y) such
that y ∈ RA∪S(g) is given by yj = vj (g)−di
j if j 6= i and yi = c(g,C)−
P
j6=i yj.
If player i ∈ A is chosen as proposer and his proposal is rejected, he declares
solvent iﬀ ci0 ≤ vi.
Assume player α 6= i is chosen as proposer and makes a proposal (g,y).I f
i ∈ A ∪ S (g),t h e np l a y e ri accepts the proposal iﬀ vi (g) − yi ≥ da
i .
Assume the proposer is α and proposes an optimal graph g.G i v e ni ∈ N\α,
we check that these strategies yield ¯ ϕi for player i.
• If i ∈ (A ∩ S (g))\α,t h e nh eg e t svi−yi−xα
i = vi−(vi − dα
i )−(dα
i − ¯ ϕi)=
¯ ϕi;
• if i ∈ P ∩ S (g),t h e nh eg e t svi − yi = vi − (vi − dα
i )=dα
i =0=¯ ϕi;









Moreover, given that following the strategies an optimal graph is formed,
the proposer also obtains ¯ ϕα.
We now show that all net oﬀers X (i) are equal to zero. Following the above























j − ¯ ϕj
¢
=0 .
To check that the previous strategies constitute an equilibrium note, ﬁrst,
that the strategies after the proposer α is chosen are best responses. By in-
duction hypothesis, the ﬁnal payoﬀ after rejection is dα
i for all i ∈ N\α.I ft h e
proposal is accepted, the ﬁnal payoﬀ is vi (g)−yi = dα
i for all i ∈ N.T h u s ,t h e
responders act optimally.
We now check that the proposer has no proﬁtable deviation.
The payoﬀ for the proposer is
vα − yα = vα − c(g,C)+
X
i∈A∪S(g)\α
[vi (g) − dα
i ].
We see two cases:
• If cα0 <v α,t h e ndα =¯ ϕ(A\α,P,C+α) and thus
























Assume player α deviates and makes an unacceptable oﬀer. Then, his
payoﬀ is vα − cα0. By induction hypothesis, players in A\α create an









vi (g0) − c
¡
g0,C+α¢




+ vα − cα0
f r o mw h e r ew ed e d u c et h a tvα − yα ≥ vα − cα0 and player α does not
improve.
15• If cα0 >v α,t h e ndα =¯ ϕ(A\α,P ∪ α,C) and thus
vα − yα = vα − c(g,C)+
X
i∈A\α







vi (g) − c(g,C) −
X
i∈A\α
¯ ϕi (A\α,P ∪ α,C)








Assume player α deviates and makes an unacceptable oﬀer. Then, his
ﬁnal payoﬀ is vα − cα0.S i n c evα − yα =0>v α − cα0,p l a y e ra does not
improve.
Assume now that player i ∈ A changes his oﬀers x
j





i, he will be chosen as the proposer with certainty, and
his ﬁnal outcome would still equal ¯ ϕi. Moreover, any increase in one of his oﬀers
will mean that, if he is not the proposer, his ﬁnal payoﬀ decreases.
We now show that any equilibrium yields ¯ ϕ as ﬁnal outcome. We ﬁrst prove
the following claim:
Claim: Assume the proposer is α and he proposes (g,y) such that
yi <v i − dα
i
for all i ∈ S (g)\α and






for all i ∈ A ∩ D(g). Then, this oﬀer is accepted.
By induction hypothesis, the payoﬀ after rejection for player i ∈ A∪S (g)\α
is dα




− yi for all i ∈ A ∩ D(g). Thus, it is straightforward to check
by backward induction that in equilibrium the oﬀer is accepted.
We will prove that, given any ε>0,a n yp l a y e ri can assure himself a ﬁnal
payoﬀ of at least ¯ ϕi − ε.
By Lemma 3, this is true if there exists an optimal graph such that i/ ∈ S (g).
Assume then i ∈ S (g) for each optimal graph g. We consider now the following
strategy:




i − ¯ ϕi to each j ∈ A\i.
If player i ∈ A is chosen as proposer, he proposes (g,y) such that g is an
optimal graph. Moreover, y ∈ RA∪S(g) is given by
yj = vj − di
j −
ε
|A ∪ S (g) − 1|












|A ∪ S (g) − 1|
for all j ∈ A ∩ D(g).
Assume player α is chosen as proposer and makes a proposal (g,y). Then,
player i rejects the proposal.
Following this strategy, two things may happen:
1. Player i is not chosen as proposer. Then, he pays xα
i = dα
i − ¯ ϕi to the
proposer α. Moreover, he rejects the oﬀer made by the proposer and, by
induction hypothesis, his payoﬀ afterwards is dα











i.M o r e o v e r ,

















































































































j − ε =¯ ϕi − ε.
Proposition 8 Assume players have no budget restrictions. Then, the equilib-















Figure 3: A Steiner tree problem.
Proof. In M, any passive player always get a payoﬀ of 0.T h i s m e a n s a
negative payoﬀ when players have no budget restrictions. Thus, any strategy
that involves to declare oneself as insolvent is strictly dominated by the same
strategy but declaring oneself as solvent and connecting to the source.
6S t e i n e r t r e e p r o b l e m s
The Steiner tree problems arise as cost spanning tree problems in which the arcs
can join in any place. For example, in Figure 3a), the cost of connection is 20.
However, if the arcs do not need to join in one of the nodes (for example, they
are roads or water pipes), we can restate the problem as in Figure 3b). Here,
the additional node does not need to be connected, but it would be advisable,
because it decreases the minimal cost of connection (from 20 to 18).
In this example, nodes a and b are called terminal nodes, and node c is a
Steiner node.
Formally, a Steiner tree is deﬁned as a minimum-weight tree connecting the
terminal nodes, such that the tree may include Steiner nodes.
In fact, we can see a Steiner tree problem as a generalized cost spanning tree
problem. We just need to assign a big value to the terminal nodes and 0 to the
Steiner nodes (see Figure 4).
Moreover, a possible cost allocation in Steiner trees may be given by ¯ ϕ,w i t h
A the set of terminal nodes, and P the set of Steiner nodes. Note that ¯ ϕ assigns









Figure 4: A Steiner tree problem as a generalized cost spanning tree problem.
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